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Being and Information: 
 





A philosophy, such as Gianni Vattimo’s, which cedes thought’s quest for 
certain knowledge of objective structures to interpretations of historically conditioned 
circumstances, would seem to surrender its own claims to validity and relevance to 
the vagaries of those circumstances. From this perspective, Vattimo’s thought would 
appear to have achieved the apogee of its relevance in the ‘postmodern moment’ of 
the nineteen-eighties, when the hard-won lessons of his engagements with Nietzsche 
and Heidegger allowed him to formulate a distinctive and coherent meaning of ‘the 
postmodern’ in philosophy.1 Despite the fact that Vattimo’s weak thought was 
distinctively philosophical, it arguably found itself confirmed in thousands of echoes 
from every corner of contemporary academia and wider culture: the claims that there 
is very little of Being as objective structure left, and that there are no truths, only 
interpretations, appeared to resonate with the cultural Zeitgeist and legitimate 
Vattimo’s philosophy as an ‘ontology of actuality.’2 
By contrast, the current moment seems in many respects characterisable in 
terms of a sustained critical backlash against postmodernism. Theses such as the ‘end 
of history’ and ‘incredulity toward metanarratives’ are widely thought to have lost 
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their relevance after the terrorist attacks of September 11, and contemporary 
continental philosophy and the humanities generally seem to favour a return to 
metaphysics, to the import of the natural sciences, to materialism, the object, and to 
concepts such as the real, truth, and the subject. Diverse as they are, these themes are 
united by all being ones which the postmodern moment seemed on the verge of 
dissolving.3  
How are we to understand the meaning and potential legacy of Vattimo’s work, 
given the apparent dissolution of his own claims into the movement of history, and 
the current historical moment’s seeming relegation of his work to irrelevancy? The 
position of philosophers and philosophies in a ‘traditional’ metaphysical mold here is 
by comparison relatively unproblematic: they can continue on doing their work of 
making ahistorical truth claims, entirely ignoring the historical, cultural currents 
which push them in and out of fashion. Yet Vattimo’s philosophy, as we have noted, 
cannot position itself in such a way since it understands itself as an interpretation in, 
and as, history. 
My answer would be that we may frame Vattimo’s relevance in terms of a 
deeper and more sweeping understanding of history than the flotsam and jetsam of the 
cultural market (which of course operates within the academy, as elsewhere). In 
Heideggerian terms, Vattimo’s philosophy is positioned in relation to historical 
destining (Geschick), or as Being-historical thinking (Seynsgeschichtliches Denken), 
which aims to uncover not just history’s manifold and fleeting appearances, but its 
essence (Wesen). On this basis, I propose here a reading of Vattimo which seeks to 
focus attention on what I believe to be some of the key insights in his work, which 
concern the ontological constitution of meaning in the contemporary world. My 
subtitle should thus be read in the double sense of the genitive: the meaning of 
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Vattimo – his philosophical importance and legacy – lies in the reflections on 
meaning he has contributed. Within this rubric, I will argue that Vattimo’s relevance 
and importance may be seen through his indights regarding information, and its link 
to Being (which for Vattimo, we may understand to be equivalent to meaning). These 
are insights which I believe must be extended and developed in order to accord to 
Vattimo the legacy that his work deserves. This line of interpretation is certainly not 




The Meaning of Nihilism 
 
For Vattimo, as for Heidegger, the attempt to understand Being is the attempt to 
understand how it is that things are meaningful at all, that is, to understand how 
meaning is ontologically constituted. As is of course well known, Heidegger believes 
this fabric of meaningfulness to be fragile, and he takes up Nietzsche’s term nihilism 
to index the loss of meaning in the contemporary age. For Heidegger, this loss is 
equivalent to the ‘oblivion of Being,’ the occlusion of the source of the 
meaningfulness of things by the things themselves, standing out as meaningful. For 
Heidegger, this means both the philosophical forgetting of the meaning of Being 
through a forgetting of the ontological difference between Being and beings (taking a 
particular being as the highest and source of meaning for all others, as does the 
tradition he names ‘metaphysics’), and the practical realization and completion of 
metaphysics in modern technology.4 
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Heidegger argues that the originary Greek meaning of Being is ‘presence’ - 
οὐσία (ousia) and παρουσία (parousia)5 – and that this meaning has determined the 
history of metaphysical thinking about Being. Moreover, he insists that it is not 
enough that we retrieve this meaning of Being, which understands it through only one 
of its temporal modes (the present); we must develop a properly temporal and 
historical way of thinking Being such that all the various ways in which things come 
to be can be more adequately thought.6 And as is well known (though, like most 
everything about Heidegger, not undisputed), the attempt to think beyond the 
‘metaphyics of presence’ is what leads Heidegger, through the famous Kehre, to 
move away from the possibility of any transcendental, a priori determination of 
Being, even through an elaboration of Dasein in its ecstatic temporality, to a ‘being-
historical thinking.’ The point here is that Being and Time seeks to think ontological 
temporality in a way which itself seems to be a fixed, atemporal structure, rather than 
allowing that this philosophical understanding of Being has itself come to light 
through an historical event (Ereignis) of Being, and is subject to passing away.  
It is precisely this ‘temporalisation of the a priori’ which Vattimo elaborates in 
his exemplary reading of Heidegger, and develops for an understanding of the 
constitution of meaning in the contemporary age. Vattimo sees French philosophers 
of difference, such as Derrida and Deleuze, as developing theories of ontological 
difference (différance; pure difference) which effectively repeat Heidegger’s early 
mistake by being atemporal structures which explain how difference operates 
temporally. In order to avoid this difficulty – and, as Vattimo puts it, to properly 
preserve the ontological difference between Being and beings – he insists on a 
historical interpretation of Being, whereby by Being is not, but rather sends or 
transmits itself through time. Being occurs as a transmission (Überlieferung) and as 
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‘destining’ (Geschick); it occurs as, and allows, the events of opening (Ereignis) 
which allow beings to appears as what they are, with the meanings they have for us as 
historically constituted Dasein.7: ‘The world plays itself out in horizons constructed 
by a series of echoes, linguistic resonances, and messages coming from the past and 
from others (others along side us as well as other cultures).’8 As this quotation 
indicates, it is this historical determination of Being as sending or transmission which 
leads Vattimo – following Heidegger and Gadamer – to emphasis language, a point to 
which we will return in more detail below. 
Key to Vattimo’s originality and significance is his decision to reject 
Heidegger’s attempt to think a ‘return’ of Being, and to assert nihilism as the 
‘authentic’ ontological condition of the contemporary age. According to Vattimo, 
nihilism as the oblivion of Being should be understood as the decline or 
disappearance of the metaphysical determination of Being as stable structure or 
enduring presence, such that there is in the contemporary world very little of Being in 
this classical sense left. This means, concomitantly, that meaning no longer persists as 
stable, closed horizons of meaning and value as it did in more autochthonous cultures, 
rooted in blood and soil, and that philosophy can no longer understand its purview as 
that of strongly grounded claims to knowledge of objective truths. Rather, Vattimo 
argues that the interpretation of Being as historical transmission, outlined above, is 
more consistent with the ontological nihilism that Heidegger decries than with the 
side of Heidegger’s thought that longs for a return of Being, as though it might once 
again be ‘present.’  
Vattimo’s decision to ‘apologise’ for nihilism means that nihilism is not only 
the negation of meaning, but that the nihilistic situation in which we find ourselves, in 
which Being is in oblivion, itself constitutes meaning in a certain way. Again, the 
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double sense of the genitive must be invoked: the meaning of nihilism, for Vattimo, is 
that there is a meaning of nihilism. As Heidegger emphasises, in fact, the forgetting of 
Being is not something issuing from the human, but rather, is Being itself in its 
default.9 According to Vattimo this means the dissolution of the ‘strong structures’ of 
Being in the historical destining of its transmission, where meaning is constituted by 
the traces of the past which are handed down to us, and which are never present in 
their fullness. In this way, Vattimo thinks through not just Heidegger, but the 
Nietzschean meaning of nihilism as the death of God, and the question of what values 
should animate our lives in the wake of this death. While this move in itself presents a 
challenging originality, it is in Vattimo’s meditations on the meaning of science and 
technology for the contemporary constitution of meaning, that the real interest of his 
work comes to the fore. We may begin to explore this through his confrontation with 




Ge-Stell and Information Technology 
 
It’s information technology which constitutes the essence of Ge-Stell, or at least one of 
its poles; thanks to it the Ge-Stell can offer a chance of overcoming metaphysics. 
                                                             - Vattimo “Au-delà de la matière et du texte,” 61. 
 
 
Heidegger’s well-known and influential philosophy of technology sees its 
essence as Ge-Stell, the ‘enframing’ which determines beings as available and 
exploitable resources (Bestand). Technology realises the project of modern 
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metaphysics, the Cartesian dream according to which man, as subject, becomes 
master and possessor of the world of manipulable objects.10 True to his affirmation of 
a positive meaning of nihilism, Vattimo reads Heidegger as offering an interpretation 
of technology which would allow us to affirm it as a defining characteristic of our 
nihilistic epoch. In the collaborative biography Not Being God, Vattimo points to the 
origin of one of his own most important insights: 
 
There is a page in Heidegger that I have twisted and turned in every possible way, 
because it’s the only one in which he says that maybe the new event of Being, an 
eventuation of Being different from metaphysics, can come about in the ensemble of 
the technological world, which may be the extreme point of damnation, the most total 
forgetting of Being, but might also turn out to be a first flash of the event. 
Surprising. Gadamer personally confirmed to me that when Heidegger made that 
statement during a lecture, it wasn’t just an offhand remark. Indeed, he was perfectly 
well aware of the “scandalous” character of what he was saying. Except that he never 
said it again.11 
 
The passage in question is from Identity and Difference. It reads, in part, as follows. 
 
What we experience in the frame as the constellation of Being and man through the 
modern world of technology is a prelude to what is called the event of appropriation. 
This event, however, does not necessarily persist in its prelude. For in the event of 
appropriation the possibility arises that it may overcome the mere dominance of the 
frame to turn it into a more originary appropriating.  
[…] 
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The event of appropriation is that realm, vibrating within itself, through which man and 
Being reach each other in their nature, achieve their active nature by losing those 
qualities with which metaphysics has endowed them. 
[…] 
The appropriation appropriates man and Being to their essential togetherness. In the 
frame, we glimpse a first, oppressing flash of the appropriation.12 
 
Heidegger’s now well-known German term translated here by Joan Stambaugh as 
‘appropriation’ or ‘event of appropriation’ is Ereignis. In what way might the Ge-
Stell, the essence of modern technology, allow a prelude to, and a flash of, the 
Ereignis, the event through and by which Being occurs and constitutes meaning? 
Vattimo draws our attention to several key points. 
First, he emphasises that according to Heidegger Ge-Stell is not all of Ereignis, 
but only its prelude.13 Moreover, ‘[w]hat constitutes Ge-Stell as a prelude to Ereignis 
is its mobile and transitive character.’14 That is, there is a constitutive instability, a 
“shaking,” in Ereignis. Vattimo explains that while the most obvious, and most 
commonly understood, aspect of Heidegger’s interpretation of the essence of modern 
technology is “the governance of planning, calculation and potentially total 
organization,” in fact this is subordinate to “an urging as continuous dislocation,” an 
urging by which we are challenged and provoked.15 In defence of this interpretation 
of the unstable character of Ereignis, he emphasises a number of Heidegger’s terms in 
this passage, such as Schwingen (oscillation) and schwebend (fluctuating).16 What he 
sees as most significant, however, is Heidegger’s suggestion that in the shaking, 
oscillation and fluctuation of Ge-Stell, man and Being reach each other by “losing 
those qualities with which metaphysics has endowed them.” And in general, 
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according to Vattimo’s reading of other texts of Heidegger’s, the qualities alluded to 
here must by primarily subject (man) and object (Being).17 
Vattimo’s closest interpretation of this passage, to my knowledge, is to be found 
in the essay “Dialectic and Difference,” which I have just been citing. However, it is 
elsewhere, in later writings, that Vattimo develops this possibility most fully and 
originally by identifying the prelude of Ereignis in Ge-Stell with the transition from 
machine technology to information technology. In the essay “Ethics of 
Communication or Ethics of Interpretation?”, for example, he writes: 
 
This possibility, only glimpsed by Heidegger, might become explicit and recognizable 
only with the profound modification undergone by Ge-Stell, the world of the technical, 
with the transition from mechanical technology to information technology. It is well 
known that today the distinction between developed and underdeveloped countries is 
no longer made in terms of the possession of mechanical technology capable of 
bending, concentrating and overcoming the forces of nature, of shifting, dismantling 
and rebuilding. It is no longer a question of engines, but of computers and the networks 
connecting them which make it possible to control the more ‘primitive’ machines, that 
is, the mechanical ones. It is not in the world of machines and engines that humanity 
and being can shed the mantles of subject and object, but in the world of generalised 
communication.18 
 
In the same essay, Vattimo explains how he sees the loss of subject and object taking 
place through information technologies.  
 
First, the object: 
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Here the entity dissolves in the images distributed by the information media, in the 
abstraction of scientific objects (whose correspondence with real ‘things’ open to 
experience can no longer be seen) or technical products (that do not even make contact 
with the real world via their use value, since the demands they satisfy are increasingly 
artificial).19  
 
And then, the subject: 
 
Whereas the subject, on its part, is less and less a centre of self-consciousness and 
decision-making, reduced as it is to being the author of statistically predicted choices, 
playing a multiplicity of social roles that are irreducible to a unity.20  
 
According to Vattimo’s interpretation, then, machine technology concerns itself with 
the physical manipulation of nature, so implies a willing subject and dominated 
objects. By contrast, information technology disrupts the positions of subject and 
object, first because the object dissolves in multiplication of images which represent 
it, in the abstraction of scientific representations, and in the loss of reality of 
consumer products (we might think here of Jean Baudrillard’s works from The System 
of Objects to Symbolic and Exchange and Death21).  
It may seem that technological mastery, extended by technological 
developments (and information technology may be thought, on the cybernetic model, 
that by extending powers of communication we also extend powers of control), would 
lead only to a strengthening of the position of subject. However, Vattimo points to a 
‘dialectic’ whereby this is in fact not the case: the very success of technology, indexed 
by the development and growing importance of information technology, means that 
the subject becomes involved in such processes, more ‘objectified,’ but also, as such, 
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subject to those mutations affecting the object itself in this situation. The position of 
the subject is thus also undermined, because it becomes less of a centre of self-
consciousness and decision-making (think of the arguments of N. Katherine Hayles 
and others concerning ‘distributed cognition’22), it plays a multiplicity of social roles 
that are irreducible to a unity, and because there is no centre of communication 
networks, and thus no hegemonic position for the subject to occupy in a world 
conditioned by such networks.  
A further significant point Vattimo makes, in the essay “Au-delà de la matière 
et du texte,” concerns the ambiguity we may see between subject and object if we 
follow the etymology of the term ‘matter.’ In addition to οὐσία, Aristotle used the 
term ὑποκείμενον (hypokeimenon) to designate ‘substance.’ In one sense, that of what 
remains the same in a thing as it undergoes change, Aristotle associates ὑποκείμενον 
with matter: it is the ‘material substrate’ which underlies a thing, and remains the 
same even as its accidental properties change.23 As Vattimo notes, translated into 
Latin ὑποκείμενον became subiectum, the subject of modern metaphysics: so in the 
history of philosophy we see a transition from understanding the substrate, that which 
underlies, which provides stability and is immune to change, from the objectivity of 
matter to the subjectivity of the subject. Vattimo then notes how these terms are 
complicated in modern technology: 
 
At the culminating moment of metaphysics, when it deploys itself totally as Ge-Stell, 
not only matter (re)becomes hypokeimenon, subject, but the subject also retrieves its 
characteristic of hypokeimenon, of matter. It is no longer only subject, but also possible 
object of manipulation and calculation.24  
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Adopting Vattimo’s much-used term ‘oscillation,’ then, we may understand his thesis 
that subject and object break down in the Ge-Stell of information technology because 
the subject and the object pass alternately from pole to pole, the object taking on more 
features of the subject, the subject taking on more features of the object, ever 
oscillating (and perhaps at an increasing rate, as information technology continues to 
develop) until each of these terms becomes indistinguishable from the other, and both 
have lost those features which, in the modern philosophical tradition, determined 
them as subject and object in the first place.  
Vattimo’s great insight here – and this, I contend, is one of the points of his 
continued relevance – is to see the crucial importance of the ontological shift 
attendant to the shift from machine technology to information technology, and to 
understand the ontological significance of information in terms of the breakdown of 
the distinction between subject and object. What this means for Vattimo, then, is that 
we may in fact find a way through Heidegger to embrace the contemporary 
technological world, not as one essentially ruled by metaphysical domination, but 
rather as allowing the possibility of a kind of postmetaphysical ‘emancipation.’ The 
passage through Heidegger is crucial, as it allows him to develop a position which is 
at once firmly opposed to the idea of technology as what allows human beings to take 
the position of demiurgos in relation to nature (an ideal of mastery still widely 
popular in non-ontological philosophies of technology), and to link technology and 
the world it is creating to an ontological conception of how meaning is constituted in 
this world (a consideration typically bracketed by non-ontological conceptions). For 
Vattimo, such a meaning is essentially linked to the multiplicity of messages 
transmitted by the information technologies of contemporary media culture, which he 




Vattimo’s Way to Language 
 
Vattimo’s work may be understood as a contribution to the ‘linguistic turn’ 
which is often thought to be the major characterising feature of philosophy (both 
analytic and continental) in the twentieth century.25 Indeed, Vattimo seems to make 
the focus on language a key component of Being’s self-dissolution in recent 
philosophical reflection, particularly in Heidegger’s post-Kehre focus on language 
and the linguistic orientation of Gadamer’s hermeneutic ontology. From both, 
Vattimo develops an interpretation which sees an identification of Being with 
language. 
As Vattimo has noted on numerous occasions, this identification was crystalized 
for him in an interpretive choice concerning a particular line in Truth and Method he 
faced when translating the text.26 The line in question is: ‘Being that can be 
understood is language.’27 The choice concerns whether, and how, to include the 
commas which accompany the German text, and the meaning that would result. The 
possible placement of commas is as follows: ‘Being[,] that can be understood[,] is 
language.’ Without commas (the choice of the English translators, cited above) the 
sentence seems to imply that only Being that can be understood is language, such that 
there would be a realm of Being which cannot be understood, and is not language. 
Vattimo’s choice, however, is to emphasise the placement of the commas, allowing a 
reading which would mean: ‘It can be understood that Being is language.’  
For Vattimo, this identification contributes to the nihilistic ‘ontology of decline’ 
insofar as Being, dissolved in the fluidity of linguistic messages and the ambiguities 
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and play of multiple interpretations, means that Being can no longer be understood as 
a unified objective structure. Moreover, the linguistic interpretation of Being, in 
concord with Heidegger’s Geschick and Gadamer’s Überlieferung, contributes to its 
historicisation, insofar as what allows things to be what they are can no longer be 
conceived in terms of atemporal transcendental structures, but as the passing down or 
historical transmission of messages from the past, through tradition. According to 
Vattimo, the theses on language found in Heidegger and Gadamer mean that 
                                             
one should rather say that things are what they truly are, only within the realms of 
interpretation and language. In other words, a consistent formulation of hermeneutics 
requires a profound ontological revolution, because ontology must bid farewell to the 
idea of an objectified, external Being to which thought should strive to adequate 
itself.28 
 
Importantly for our interests here, Vattimo extends this identification of Being and 
language in the context of his reflections on technology, by arguing that it is one of 
the implications of the transition from machine to information technology. Indeed, he 
claims that this transition coincides in important ways with the linguistic turn in 
philosophy. 29 
The ‘flash of Ereignis’ which becomes possible with Ge-Stell is then, for 
Vattimo, precisely the identification of Being as language, understood in its 
ontological vocation as a historical transmission which constitutes meaning, and 
which finds itself, in the actuality of the current epoch, in a nihilistic state not only 
insofar as Being is revealed as such a historical transmission, but insofar as it appears 
as multiple and conflictual interpretations, to which we are exposed by the increased 
transmitting power of information technologies. For Vattimo, then, what is most 
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important about information technologies is that they allow a transmission of 
messages, understood on the hermeneutic model of language as interpretations. The 
contemporary media society ‘weakens’ being insofar as it erodes the constitutive 
power of a single, relatively coherent tradition or cultural horizon to determine the 
meaning of things, and exposes us to increasingly multiple and inconsistent 
interpretations. For Vattimo, information technologies make possible a social reality 
in which – in a way with far wider implications than scholarly traditions of textual 
interpretation would suggest – hermeneutics becomes the koiné of our age.30 
Following Gadamer, Vattimo argues that the logos, what gives thought meaning 
and direction, must in the contemporary era be understood as language itself.31 Yet 
this is in the sense of natural language, the language which is used and is meaningful 
in the ‘language-consciousness community,’ as opposed to the specialised, technical, 
and formal languages used in the sciences and in specialised disciplines. Following 
his interpretations of Heidegger and Gadamer, Vattimo argues that the task of thought 
is to ‘renew’ – that is, give a meaningful interpretation to - the specialised ‘language 
games’ at the heart of the community of natural language speakers, to convert the 
purity, formalisation and exactness of these languages into the impurity and 
historicity of natural language. For Vattimo this means reappropriating the languages 
of technoscience, which often retain the modern metaphysical character of objective 
reference, in terms of the historicity of natural languages, and thus submitting them to 
the nihilistic destiny of Being. Moreover, he assigns to natural language the status of a 
metalanguage32; which, perhaps paradoxically, ‘grounds’ the ontological meaning of 
the various language games in the ungrounded, nihilistic historical destining of Being. 
According to Vattimo, the development of the essence of Ge-Stell in 
information technology is linked to this priority of natural language because the 
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multiplication of messages it allows produces the ambiguities of interpretation 
associated with such language (as opposed to the exactness and unambiguity of 
specialised languages). In this respect, the key features of information technology for 
Vattimo are “symbolic forms,” “languages,” and “signs,” which he calls the “matter” 
of such technologies. 33 Vattimo’s hermeneutic ontology thus results in a kind of 
textualism, in which there is no ‘objective structure’ outside the play of languages and 
textual interpretations. Nevertheless, he argues against other philosophies of 
textualism, such as those of Rorty and Derrida, by insisting that there is something 
‘beyond’ the text which gives direction to thought even as it interprets it, and this is 
Being itself understood as historical occurrence. Indeed, for Vattimo textualism itself 
must not be considered as a discovery of the objective nature of Being, but only itself 
as an event of Being, a way in which Being has brought itself to light in the present 
epoch. He writes: 
 
From this perspective, one can formulate the hypothesis, by way of provisional 
conclusion, that the dissolution-resolution of matter by signs, by language, by texts, is a 
moment in a process (which is the history of Being, and not only the history of texts) in 
which Being follows a destiny of ‘weakening.’ One can show that the history of 
modernity as secularisation (where it takes leave of the sacred and of the violence that 
it brings with it), contained in this process, to which the Nietzschean conception of 
nihilism, and the necessarily ‘epochal’ character of Heideggerian Being, allude.34 
 
As Vattimo says here, the linguistic turn is understood from the perspective of his 
nihilistic hermeneutic ontology as “a moment in a process.” Yet might it be that, since 
Vattimo wrote these words in 1985, this process has continued to develop, and that 





From the Linguistic Turn to the Informational Turn 
 
 
Only when we turn thoughtfully toward what has already been thought, will we be 
turned to use for what must still be thought. 
                                                - Heidegger, Identity and Difference, 41. 
 
 
The case for a shift from the ‘linguistic turn’ to an ‘informational turn’ has been 
made by some philosophers who work in the area which has recently become known 
as Philosophy of Information.35 On a broad cultural level, such a turn seems justified 
by the increasingly pervasive impact of information technologies on the lives of 
people living in the most technologically advanced societies, as well as the 
importance the concept of information has come to have not only in computer 
science, but in areas as diverse as biological science (and thus our understanding of 
life itself), engineering (the artefactual world), the global market (the material 
economy), and the arts (electronic musics and literatures, video art and CGI, and so 
on). In philosophy, the concept developed rather narrowly within research in logic, 
epistemology, and language, but is now being presented by some as a broad new 
paradigm, or even a new philosophia prima, which would investigate not only the 
nature of information, and the various areas in which it has gained significance such 
as those just mentioned, but also its transformative impact on the nature of thinking 
and how we perceive ourselves as (post)human. Luciano Floridi, one of the most 
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prominent advocates of such an informational turn, presents its emergence as a logical 
progression in the history of philosophy, whereby the linguistic turn was inspired by 
reflection on the domain whereby information technologies are managed, before 
moving to the consideration of their very fabric and essence, information itself.36 
Floridi further identifies the informational turn with what he calls the ‘fourth 
revolution,’ which, after the revolutions of Copernicus, Darwin, and Freud, further 
decenters humanism by reconceiving human beings as informational agents 
(‘inforgs’) among others in a world conceptualised in informational terms.37 
The meaning of this turn cannot currently be specified with a great degree of 
exactness, in no small part because there is still no agreement on the meaning (or 
range of meanings) that should be accorded the term ‘information’ (including how 
exactly it differs from language).38 However, this state of open contestation over the 
meaning of information contributes to its claim to being a decisive concept for our 
current epoch, insofar as it presents itself as being something the meaning of which is 
at stake. If Being is to be understood, as Vattimo insists it is, as what is never fully 
present but is only historically ‘transmitted,’ and recollected, as what is declining and 
gives beings in the horizon of this decline, then we must see Being as what can be 
historically “recoded” according to the messages which arrive to us in a given era. In 
this light, I would like to propose that what Vattimo gives only a hint of (though an 
important hint) can be formulated in more rigorous and extensive terms by proposing 
that as the linguistic turn in philosophy turns into the informational turn, we can 
recode Being informationally and understand the deepening of nihilism not just as 
something occurring now, in the twentieth-first century, but as a process of 
dissolution we can now see as the operative factor in the twentieth century, 
subtending the linguistic turn itself.  
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Like language, information is a modality of the thinking of Being we can now 
identify in the history of philosophy at least since Plato.39 From our current position, 
we can interpret what now appear as key ontological factors trans-epochally, as 
Vattimo indicates in the following passage: 
 
To think, to hear, to recall an event is not to see it speculatively from the exterior, but 
to be inside transmitting back towards the moment where it has taken place in the past 
and forward towards its future possibilities.40 
 
In fact, we may see a shift from the linguistic turn to the informational turn as a 
further step in the process Vattimo identifies as an ‘ontology of decline.’ Following 
the logic of this decline allows us to offer an interpretation which differs to some 
degree from Vattimo’s, not on the basis on stable structures, but as Being seems now 
to show itself, no longer as language, but as information. What then can we say about 
the difference between language and information? While Vattimo extensively 
discusses both language and information technology in his interpretations of 
Heidegger, to my knowledge he gives little consideration to what Heidegger himself 
wrote about the relation of language and information qua information (and not simply 
information technology). We may approach the topic of language and information by 
looking at what Heidegger had to say on the issue. 
In his essay “The Way to Language,” information is seen as a particular view 
of, or treatment of, language. (Significantly, this essay was presented at a seminar on 
language at which Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker presented a talk entitled “Language 
as Information.”41) Specifically, for Heidegger language as information is natural 
language submitted to a formalised reduction. In ways clearly linked to his discussion 
of the reduction of nature to Bestand by Ge-Stell, he writes: 
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Speech is challenged to correspond to the ubiquitous orderability of what is present. 
Speech, when posed in this fashion, becomes information. It informs itself concerning 
itself, in order to establish securely, by means of information theories, its own 
procedure. Enframing, the essence of modern technology that holds sway everywhere, 
ordains for itself a formalised language – that kind of informing by virtue of which man 
is molded and adjusted into the technical-calculative creature, a process by which step-
by-step he surrenders his “natural language.”42  
 
For Heidegger, the essential character of language relates to the original meaning of 
saying as ‘showing,’43 and it plays a key role in the event of Being by which beings 
come to light as they are in the world we inhabit. Language for Heidegger is not 
primarily an instrument of communication or a calculus of concepts, but part of the 
process by which beings, including the human speaker who uses language, shows up 
as what they are. As he puts it, ‘[w]e not only speak language, we speak from out of 
it.’44 According to Heidegger, this ontological vocation of language seems to require 
the ambiguities of natural language, and he sees the concept of information primarily 
as the appearance of Ge-Stell in the realm of language, just as its key role in 
cybernetics – the crowning achievement of Ge-Stell – would suggest.45  
If we now reflect on Vattimo’s meditations on Ge-Stell, we might immediately 
see that a question is raised about the status of language and information in Vattimo’s 
work. In short: if information is Ge-Stell in language, and if Ge-Stell finds its opening 
onto postmetaphysical possibility in information technology, then must not thought 
which would pursue a path of fidelity to Vattimo’s reconsider the relation between 
language and information as thought by Heidegger? And, more significantly, might 
not this line, if pursued rigorously, seriously question Vattimo’s own fidelity to Being 
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as language, understood primarily on the traditional model of hermeneutics, as the 
natural languages of cultures and human interpretations? 
As far as Vattimo’s discussions of the question of natural and formal languages 
goes, he seems to follow Heidegger in situating the positive ontological capacities of 
language solely on the side of natural language and, by implication, sees formal 
languages – including ‘information,’ as Heidegger understands it – only as a threat to 
this ontological vocation. Indeed, as we have seen, for Vattimo formal languages need 
in some sense to be brought back into the ontological fold of the natural languages. 
What constitutes the difference between natural and specialised languages in 
Vattimo’s account seems to correspond with what Heidegger understands of 
information, that it is a formalisation of natural language. However, Vattimo sees the 
task of renewing specialised languages in natural language as one which information 
technologies are able to accomplish, because he sees them primarily as instruments 
for the transmission of linguistic messages, which include those of natural languages; 
he does not penetrate deeper into how information as such (as described by 
information theory) changes the nature of such messages, nor how it in fact also 
works to break down the metaphysical subject/object opposition.  
Vattimo’s argument that specialised languages must be reappropriated by 
natural languages is indeed a coherent way of thinking how such languages may not 
only be nihilistic in the negative sense, but may have an ontological, meaningful 
dimension as well. And yet, retaining this focus on language, I would argue, limits the 
nihilistic dissolution Vattimo asserts to a kind of humanism with respect to how 
meaning may be constituted – not the humanism of a subject, to be sure, but the 
humanism of a natural language spoken in a human community.46 To understand the 
changes of the contemporary world, we need to develop further the line of thought 
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Vattimo has opened up, to challenge the position of natural language specified by 
Heidegger and Gadamer, which acts as a source and central space for the grounding 
of meaning. The meaning of meaning must itself be questioned, and the constitution 
of meaning must be opened to processes which are purely informational, and which 
are not recuperable in natural languages.  
 
 




Vattimo himself indicates a dissatisfaction with Gadamer for his continued 
humanism in relation to science when he writes the following:  
 
Philosophical reflection on science should be historical reflection on the aftermath of 
the transformation of our existence by this strain of cultural activity. Naturally, this 
stance is part of my overall attempt to think in terms of the ontology of actuality, to 
answer the question: what of Being in a world in which the empirical, experimental, 
mathematical sciences have developed along certain lines and yielded certain 
technological results? 
In this respect, I disagree squarely with the traditional image of the philosophy/science 
relationship, especially as Gadamer portrays it in Truth and Method, and Heidegger 
too, though Heidegger is more astute … [….] 
 
The key point for Gadamer here is that  
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truth lies in the experience of common, non-specialised language, which governs 
scientific language as well. This is the overriding aspect for Gadamer. Fundamentally, 
his stance is always a defense of humanism ...’48  
 
In fact, then, Vattimo is already part-way towards the view for which I am arguing, at 
least implicitly, since he insists (and this against Gadamer and traditional 
hermeneutics) that the messages of the sciences and technological disciplines also 
have an ontological character. However, he seems to accord them this character only 
insofar as they gain a cultural reception or philosophical interpretation.  
Heidegger’s view, which Vattimo seems implicitly to endorse, implies that 
information is just one mode of language (it is formalised, unambiguous language). 
However, the key point I want to argue here which would shift this line of thought 
further (from the linguistic turn to the informational turn) is to insist that information 
is not reducible to language. Information incorporates modes such as those discovered 
in the transmission of DNA, in the specialised discourses of electrical engineering, of 
the code of computer programming languages, and in multiple other ways which play 
a role in constituting reality, even though they are meaningless from the point of view 
of natural languages. It is information, understood in such a pluralistic sense, which is 
truly subverting metaphysics by breaking down the subject/object divide, 
subjectivizing the object and objectifying the subject.  
For example, it is not – or not only – because some particular ‘object’ is subject 
to multiple interpretations meaningful to a human community that it loses its 
character of objectivity, but because it can be ‘represented’ in terms of code which 
can be read be machines and used to transform, manipulate, and even produce and 
reproduce the object. For example, an object (re)producible by a 3D printer no longer 
has the objective character of a unique thing here and now in front of a subject, but 
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has the more fluid character of a code which can be transmitted and stored on multiple 
platforms, and used to implement processes of different machines which would 
physically produce identical objects.  
Similarly, the subject loses its character of subjectivity not only because it loses 
a possible position of hegemony in the conflict of interpretations and must become a 
decentred, mobile hermeneut, but because the concept of what it means to be human 
is changing under the developments of cognitive and other sciences. Even considered 
weakly, the interpreting subject is perhaps not adequate to the image of the human as 
a complex material arrangement in which consciousness is identified in some way 
with brain and nervous activity, and the very interpretations we make of the world are 
understood to be conditioned by physical mechanisms and neural processes of which 
we are only just starting to become aware. It can of course be argued, as Vattimo 
does, that science and its messages need to be interpreted according to cultural 
openings, or Khunian paradigms,49 but what is much harder to show is the way that 
the constitutive power of what is revealed is reducible to such interpretations.  
Understood as the nihilistic destiny of language, information does not so much 
reduce the semantic richness and ambiguity of natural languages to the impoverished 
formal precision of informational code, as remove natural language from the position 
of ontological grounding which it arguably retains for Heidegger and Gadamer. The 
most significant implication of this move – that of the linguistic turn to the 
informational turn – is to open the human sciences more fully to the natural sciences, 
and to the possibility of a ‘posthuman’ future. The nihilistic destiny of meaning 
involves precisely a loss of “symbolic forms,” insofar as they constitute a rich cultural 
horizon – they are emptied out, but also multiplied, such that our experience of 
meaning as such in the information society becomes quite different. Vattimo’s work 
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should lead in the direction of showing that information is not simply the ‘enframing’ 
of natural language, but has its own ontological dimension and vocation, and 
concomitant role in the nihilistic ontology of decline. This, indeed, is Vattimo’s 
greatest insight about meaning – that nihilism as such is the meaning of the current 
age, and that it is a potentially positive meaning – and this, I would argue, is the 
meaning of Vattimo which must be elaborated through a thinking of Being as 
information.  
Vattimo opens the way for the philosophical tradition of hermeneutic ontology 
to accord a welcome to science and technology, to which this tradition has typically 
opposed itself and sought to defend a uniquely human(istic) meaning. Science and 
technology are arguably the most powerful forces in the contemporary world 
determining the meaning of what we are, and the increased awareness of the need to 
think these ontologically is one of the defining features of the current epoch. As I 
have argued here, information may be understood as the bridge between traditional 
hermeneutics and the capacity to think the broad ontological meaning of science and 
technology. Vattimo opens the way, but we must take up and extend his thought to 
give his legacy meaning, by developing more fully the consequences of hermeneutics 
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